would not otherwise exist, and thus, are greatly impacted. 18 Lastly, ART also impacts the child's siblings, friends, future spouses, and future children. For each of these sets of people, there are personal, emotional, social, financial, and physical concerns. 19 Yes, artificial reproduction has indeed impacted families.
Artificial reproduction has also impacted family law. The magnitude of the legal scenarios is nearly as vast in scope as one's imagination, even an imagination like Douglas Adams ' . 20 Some states have a variety of regulations on ART, 21 while others have none. 22 Any experienced lawyer knows that when a client finally includes an attorney after reaching the stage of desperation in any legal matter, the law and all its incidents are not easily sorted out thereafter. 23 This article presents the three major areas of concern regarding the impact of ART on families-marriage, divorce, and children-and argues for a self-governed personally responsible decision-making paradigm that thrives in the face of minimal state regulation in every aspect of family law related to artificial reproduction. Part II considers the impact ART has had on marriage. It sets out the issues surrounding marital status and procreation generally and how ART has contributed to confusion regarding the role of procreation in society and procreation's connection to marriage. 18 See Helen M. Alvaré, The Case for Regulating Collaborative Reproduction: A Children"s Rights Perspective, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 43-44 (2003) . 19 See Zimmerman, supra note 16, at 233. 20 See ADAMS, supra note 1 (referring to his bizarre story). 21 See 23 I am reminded of the client who came into my law office with a mail order divorce kit, which he had been working on for two years to fill out, file, and complete his divorce. After a review of the papers during the initial consultation, I had to tell him that his efforts would require a great deal more legal work on my part to undo the errors, that the entire process would ultimately cost double what it would have cost originally, and the process would take twice as much time as it would have had he brought the matter to a lawyer at the outset.
Part III considers how ART impacts divorce; namely in the distribution of frozen embryos as marital property. Part IV then considers how ART has impacted children. The impact on children ranges from affording them life to causing a host of problems regarding their identity and future relationships. Finally, Part V discusses and analyzes the case of Carolyn and Sean Savage, first in the context of standard state statutory construction for ART and then in the context of their self-governed, rather than state regulated, decisions. Lastly, the article offers a plan of action to those building a family using ART.
What the Savages and the Morells have done is a remarkable model of self-governed personally responsible decision-making. 24 This article suggests that men and women desiring to be parents who choose responsible decision-making based on life affirming and family affirming choices foster the best interests of marriage, children, families, and ART itself. 25 It presents a guide to understanding the issues involved in selfgoverned personally responsible decision-making. 26 
II. IMPACT OF ART ON MARRIAGE
Family life has become somewhat confused in American culture and the foundation of that confusion is marriage. Common wisdom has been that marriage is about love, sex, and children, but people marrying for those reasons often lack the commitment to the marriage necessary for its longevity. 27 Procreation has been effectively removed from marital sex, 28 from non-marital sex generally, 29 and even from pregnancy.
30
The effectiveness of artificial reproductive techniques has removed sex from 24 See generally Fertility Clinic"s Error, supra note 11, at A11. 25 See id. 26 See id. 27 As bizarre as all of this is and sounds, the threat of gestational surrogacy is very real. It is an attempt to exploit women, reduce them to an inanimate object, and make children the equivalent of a commodity. Gestational surrogacy is a threat to the family and the dignity of human life. It denigrates women, their roles as mothers, and the mother-child relationship. This evil is only in its infancy and can be defeated, not only in court but also through legislation.
40
reflected those developing in society. ‗We don't know if these girls are experiencing these things personally but they see it around them, whether it be couples who are not married or who are divorced' . . . . ‗The findings from girls who were unemployed have real implications. Rather than early pregnancy being a mistake, it seems to be a pattern that they are expecting to follow. We need to work with youngsters to give them different horizons.' Id. The threat of creating a commodity in women is even stronger in impoverished cultures where women will act as surrogates for a host of economic reasons.
41
There is certainly no direct link between these social phenomena and the rise of ART; 42 but nonetheless, the timing is somewhat curious. Married couples using ART allow medical technicians to build their families, 43 and the Vatican has suggested that such use of ART in a marital setting conflicts with religious teachings. 44 Simultaneously, unmarried same sex couples have been major beneficiaries of the ART phenomenon as well 45 but not without conflicts. DiFonzo rightly suggested that the evolution of baby making and developing technology have made the legal questions more complicated.
47
Possibly because of the pace of the ART industry, the impact on families resulting from these points of separation and reattachment between reproduction and sexuality has not been adequately assessed. The New York Times noted that twenty-first century babies are begotten by -building a baby, with few ground rules.‖ 48 Marriage is simply not needed for procreation. 49 Indeed, frequently test tubes and Petri dishes replace romance.
50
Regardless of the issues just discussed, artificial reproduction has created great opportunities for building families and can be great for marriage. 51 In fact, embryo adoption has provided married couples like Jeff and Maria Lancaster with what they have long hoped for-a family.
52
-The family is a flexible institution by nature and will continue to accommodate changes in human reproduction‖; yet, unity of the marital partners and their communication regarding reproductive issues are often upheld/ (discussing where a male homosexual couple, who contributed sperm to artificially inseminate a Minnesota woman who agreed to be a surrogate for the men, was awarded primary custody when the surrogacy relationship broke down and the surrogate was basic elements of such success. 53 In fact, ART could possibly strengthen marriages if the couples' communication is enhanced by the choices presented for family building using ART, even if those choices involve potential marital property concerns.
54
When mistakes are made, however, they can be devastating to people and difficult on marriages. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, 55 the hospital supervisor interrupted a doctor's use of in vitro fertilization (IVF), thereby, destroying Mrs. Del Zio's -last chance to become pregnant.‖ 56 In a cause of action for conversion of property, the jury found for the hospital, and in the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the jury awarded $3 in damages to the husband and $50,000 to the wife, in light of the fact that their last chance to become biological parents had been taken from them. 57 Meanwhile, unbeknownst to the sequestered jury, across the sea in the United Kingdom Louise Brown was being born, the first child of ART.
58
In another New York case, Perry Rogers v. Fasano, 59 a newborn conceived through IVF was a different race than either of the intended parents.
60
A clinic mistake led to the Fasano family having another couple's embryos implanted; and thus, their child was actually the genetic child of another family. 61 Upon this discovery, the genetic family sued for visitation with the child, but the court denied visitation based on its finding that the genetic parents failed to take timely action regarding their parental rights after being notified of the clinical mistake. Mistakes can be damaging to marriages and can put tremendous stress on the partners. 63 This is important in light of the fact that social science continues to find that marriage is essential to family stability. 64 ART has clearly had a profound impact on marriage. The Savages 65 and the Morells 66 are still married, and the record has not been searched for a Del Zio or Fasano dissolution. Regardless, case law provides other examples of divorce resulting when ART goes poorly, as well as the inverse: ART going bad as a result of divorce.
III. IMPACT OF ART ON DIVORCE
As might be imagined, the intense emotional strain involved in infertility can cause divorce rates to be high among couples who struggle with infertility. 67 Courts have struggled with distributing embryos as marital property in divorce or providing for their custody, along with honoring contracts between the parties regarding ART or upholding liberty interests. 68 A line of cases highlights these dilemmas. The first of these cases is Davis v. Davis, 69 where the highest court of Tennessee overturned the trial court's finding that frozen embryos are children deserving of protection, holding instead that the results of ART between Junior Davis and Mary Sue Davis were neither persons nor property -but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.‖ 70 In Davis, privacy in the right not to procreate prevailed where no previous agreement existed. 71 The court awarded the embryos to Junior Davis, which he immediately 63 See Celizic, Hello and Goodbye, supra note 7; Celizic, Genetic Parents, supra note 8. 64 Where the contract between the parties provided that the embryos be destroyed, the court ruled that there was no infringement on any fundamental right of privacy or liberty interest in the right to not procreate. 76 A written contract will be upheld if it does not violate fundamental privacy rights, at least in New York. 77 In A.Z. v. B.Z., 78 the highest court in Massachusetts held that an ART contract to give custody of the parties' embryos to the wife for gestation and birth after dissolution could not be upheld because it would result in an infringement of the fundamental right of privacy and the right to not procreate. 79 A valid written contract will not be upheld if it infringes on fundamental privacy rights, at least in Massachusetts. 80 Lastly, in In re Marriage of Dahl, 81 a more recent case from Oregon's Intermediate Court of Appeals, the court upheld a contract for embryo distribution upon divorce. 82 Citing the three varying state court opinions in Davis, Kass, and A.Z., the Oregon court held that the contractual right to dispose of frozen embryos essentially amounted to personal property subject to court disposition upon dissolution. 83 The result was that the embryos were distributed to the wife for destruction over the husband's strong life-affirming objections.
84
A written contract for embryo 72 destruction will be upheld even over objections to that destruction by one of the intended parents in a divorce, at least in Oregon.
85
Reproductive property distribution in divorce has changed divorce dramatically. 86 Even if the gametic stored material has not yet been used in ART, the disposition of that material can, nonetheless, be a divorce concern.
87 These cases and those like them have indeed had a strong impact on families and family law, deterring contract reliance at the least. 88 Scholars have argued that courts ought to enforce agreements between spouses regarding distribution of the embryos. 89 This notion fosters personal responsibility for contractual obligations.
State statutes can foster this notion of personal responsibility and offer some clarity in to the context of divorce decisions regarding ART material and embryos. For example, Louisiana law forbids the intentional destruction of a cryopreserved IVF embryo and declares that disputes between parties should be resolved in the -best interest‖ of the embryo, further requiring unwanted embryos to be made available for adoptive implantation. 90 It seems that Louisiana desired to further stabilize this sense of parental responsibility for ART embryos recently, as a new statutory code indicates:
If the in vitro fertilization patients renounce, by notarial act, their parental rights for in utero implantation, then the in vitro fertilized human ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation in accordance with written procedures of the facility where it is housed or stored. The terms of the agreement meant destruction of the embryos, he would have never agreed to such a position so opposed to his pro-life beliefs. Id. at 837. 85 This type of statutory framework serves to preserve embryos through an option for a future adoption by virtue of embryo donation.
92 It also appears to buttress personal and parental responsibility in favor of the child. 93 Even this brief review of the law regarding embryo disposition reveals that ART has indeed impacted divorce dramatically.
IV. IMPACT OF ART ON CHILDREN
Children of ART have completely different concerns than their natural parents, genetic parents, gestational parents, or adoptive parents. However, that does not mean the children are abnormal in any other way. 94 A recent study of IVF adults revealed that -[t]hey're pretty much the same as people conceived the old-fashioned way.‖ 95 Identity exploration is among the first issues young adults of IVF may wish to investigate, not having the benefit of knowing the identity or anything else about their genetic parent(s). 96 In fact, as Professor Naomi Cahn suggested in her article, because children will be inquisitive about the donor and about any possible half-siblings, they may sense a loss of identity, and the family may experience more 91 Id. § 130. 92 See id. 93 of ART, even though Jackson was married at the time of the birth of two of the children: (1) Michael Joseph Jackson Jr., age 12, donor sperm and donor egg, legal mother: Debbie Rowe; (2) Paris Michael Katherine Jackson, age 11, donor sperm and donor egg, legal mother: Debbie Rowe; and (3) Prince Michael Jackson II, age 7, donor sperm, mother: unidentified surrogate.
103
Children like the Jacksons have a cemented social identity but have little understanding of their own genetic identity. 104 The legal implications of better understanding children's capacities and participation in their own welfare are becoming increasingly relevant around the world. 105 The future of children like the Jacksons and other IVF babies, however, is much more secure than that of frozen embryos who may never become children.
106
Children are not the only ones impacted by ART. Family and nonfamily siblings of ART children must deal with the possibility of accidental incest that could result from the inadvertent consanguinity between ART children.
107
Professor Cahn examined and argued for limiting the number of offspring for an individual donor 108 and protecting ART children with a Donor Sibling Registry. 109 Protecting ART children from such accidental incest seems at least reasonable, but there is currently no legitimate way to rule out sexual intercourse between adult siblings (or 103 half-siblings), though, they may be unaware of their genetic familial connection.
110
The value and worth of human life is a major conundrum. 111 The loss of a child through divorce, destruction, or clinical accident, whose birth was expected and relied upon, has not yet been explored in the ART context but could very well deserve wrongful death consideration, even as loss of society for the child and the parents. Worth of human life has been considered in the wrongful death context regarding marriage 112 but not yet in the context of ART. That matter would be a worthy discussion, as is the personal regulation of one's involvement in the ART process, even in the face of a mistake.
V. REGULATION OR SELF-GOVERNANCE?
The Savage's reality changes the rules completely. 113 The Savages and the Morells found themselves in an unintended surrogacy agreement without the benefit of a contract, a statute, or case law. 114 The response by these two families to this incredible mistake, however, illuminates the fact that laws fall short of the most appropriate remedy. 115 Rather, personally responsible decision-making on the part of all four individuals seems to rise above the moral morass and the legal abyss, 116 117 Their self-sacrificial self-governance brought about the best possible outcome for all involved in this nightmarish mistake.
118 Family law code may not only be insufficient, but it may even be harmful to the most responsible parenting. 119 It is both insightful and instructive to consider the wisdom of the decisions of these four adults, as compared to a purely legal decision a family court judge would make applying the law to this situation.
A. Ohio ART and Surrogacy
The Savages reside in Ohio. 120 There is no codification of surrogacy provisions in Ohio law, and there is no pending legislation on surrogacy or ART in Ohio. 121 pregnancy, he may rebut that presumption through genetic testing of the child.
125
The Savage's situation would obviously afford clear and convincing evidence that the child was not genetically related to Sean, which would lead to an assumed lack of consent to the embryo donation from another family. 126 There have been efforts to amend Ohio Revised Code § 3111.03, but to date, none have become law.
127
Ohio does have statutory law on non-spousal artificial insemination (AI) for the purpose of impregnating a woman so that she can bear a child that she intends to raise as her own.
128 -These sections do not deal with the artificial insemination of a wife with the semen of her husband or with surrogate motherhood,‖ 129 and they do not consider the mistaken artificial insemination of a woman with another couples' embryo. 130 Ohio also has statutory law that requires the written consent of both the husband and the wife 131 and additional law that holds that a woman who receives AI shall be treated and regarded as the natural mother of the child.
132 That law may be applied satisfactorily in the case of an embryo donation, 133 but it finds Carolyn Savage as the only legal mother of the Morrell child she carries.
intentional, consensual insemination of a woman with the semen from a man who is not her husband for the purposes of raising the child as her own). 131 Regardless of the law, from Carolyn's actions it appears she saw herself not as the legal mother but as the accidental surrogate who carried a child intended for another family because of a clinical mistake. She had no intention to abort that child, 136 though, that would have been her legal right 137 as the child's carrier.
138
One might wonder why it was in the best interest of the child for the Savages to relinquish a baby born from a desired pregnancy, because many people do not think biology determines families (adoption, for example, is a wonderful way to build a family with parents who very much want children).
139 Thus, it is easy to ask why the Savages did not keep the child Carolyn carried as their own. It is clear that Carolyn Savage had a bond with the baby to whom she gave birth, and that her family developed a bond with the baby during her pregnancy. Though not genetic, it is undeniably a flesh and blood bond. But, even though this was a wanted child and a bond was formed, in the eyes of Carolyn Savage, it was another woman's child. 140 So although she and her husband wanted a child of their own, they made a decision not based on their own interests or bonds, however strong and meritorious they may be, but based on what they thought would be the best interests of the child. While it is important to consider Carolyn's legal rights, one must also address Sean's legal rights. Under additional Ohio law, Sean would be treated as the child's natural father if he consented to the AI. 142 Thus, further complication results from the need to determine if Sean indeed consented to his wife's AI of another couple's embryo. It could be strongly asserted that his consent to his wife's AI applied only to the use of his embryos. In an ensuing analysis, Sean would have every right to disagree with his wife's intention to carry the child to term, which indeed would put stress on the Savage's marriage, if not push them to divorce. But Sean's decision to stand together with his wife and act in a manner consistent with the best interests of the child is a serious example of personal responsibility above and beyond the provisions of Ohio law.
On the other hand, Ohio law does provide that a -court, upon its own motion, may order and, upon the motion of any party to the action, shall order the child's mother, the child, the alleged father, and any other defendant in the action to submit to genetic tests.‖ 143 While Ohio statutes do not provide for the circumstances in which the Savages find themselves nor do they encourage family stability necessarily, they do provide for judicial intervention to accomplish those objectives. 144 Here, the Savages are moving forward in that fashion without the assistance of statutory regulation.
145
Would the result be different in an application of statutory family law that does cover surrogacy arrangements? A review of state regulations regarding surrogacy, such as the code in Virginia, 146 is instructive here.
B. Might a More Detailed Surrogacy Law Be More Helpful?
The Virginia Code includes in-depth ART regulation and focuses on surrogacy law, which might be informative and more instructive in ART dilemmas.
147
Virginia law defines assisted conception as -pregnancy resulting from any intervening medical technology‖ and includes numerous procedures, 142 which assist conception. 148 Because medical technology drastically alters the concept of -conception,‖ the Virginia Code defines the terms of one's -parentage‖ through assisted reproduction. 149 In order to fully answer the question of parentage, however, the facts must be placed in the correct context, and Virginia, like many states, generally follows the -intended parent‖ rationale. 150 Thus, Virginia law provides for surrogacy contracts between parties using ART, and notably, Virginia sanctions surrogacy contracts that allow a surrogate and her husband to relinquish all rights and duties as a parent of the child conceived through assisted conception to allow the intended parents to become the parents of the child.
151
Virginia law further distinguishes between surrogacy contracts that the court approved and those that the court did not approve. 152 When a court approves a surrogacy contract, the process and the outcome are more secure. 153 For example, before performing the AI, the intended parents, the surrogate, and the surrogate's husband must join in a petition to the circuit court where one of the parties resides.
154
Each party must sign and acknowledge the contract before the court, a copy of which must be attached to the petition, and the court will then promptly appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of any resulting child and appoint counsel to represent the surrogate. 155 All hearings are conducted in camera, the records are kept confidential, and at the hearing, the court enters an approval and authorization for performance of the assisted conception for a period of twelve months. 156 When birth occurs through an approved surrogacy contract, the intended parents are the parents of the child unless the court vacates the order. 157 Virginia law also provides for termination of the surrogacy contract, allowing the court leave to terminate the agreement for cause by giving a written notice of termination to all 148 Id. § 20-156. 149 Id. § 20-158. 150 Id. § 20-156. The intended parent rationale originated from Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (ruling that the parties who intended to be the child's parents by express agreement with the surrogate were indeed the legal parents). This has come to be the rule followed in many jurisdictions. parties prior to the use of assisted conception. 158 Furthermore, within 180 days of the performance of assisted conception, a genetic parent surrogate may terminate the agreement.
159
A surrogacy contract in Virginia that is not approved by a family court is less predictable and less secure but is nonetheless valid if it meets the requisite criteria. 160 Also, birth through a surrogacy contract not approved has a different parental outcome than that of an approved surrogacy contract, as the law states that -[t]he gestational mother is the child's mother unless the intended mother is a genetic parent, in which case the genetic mother is the [child's] mother.‖ 161 If one of the intended parents is a genetic parent, then the intended father is the child's father. 162 However, much like Ohio law, if the surrogate is married, her husband is a party to the surrogacy, and if the surrogate exercises her right to retain custody, then the surrogate and her husband are the parents. 163 Here, the Savages have the right to retain custody of the Morell child Carolyn carries; however, the Virginia Code offers some remedy to the Morells, because they might assert that they were the intended parents of the embryo Carolyn carries. 164 The enforceability of a surrogacy contract is an important consideration. In Virginia, if a surrogacy contract has not been subject to prior court approval, the contract is only enforceable if: (1) the surrogate, the husband of the surrogate (if any), and the intended parents are parties to the contract; 165 (2) the contract is in writing, signed by the parties, and 158 Id. § 20-161(A). 159 Id. § 20-161(B). 160 Id. § 20-162. After getting a surrogacy contract approved pursuant to § 20-162, the intended parents are the parents of the child and the surrogate and her husband are not parents. Id. § 20-158(E). 161 Id. § 20-158(E)(1). 162 Id. § 20-158(E)(2). married woman is the subject of a non-spousal artificial insemination and if her husband consented to the artificial insemination, the husband shall be treated in law and regarded as the natural father of the child . . . .‖). Furthermore, if none of the intended parents are genetic parents, the surrogate mother is the mother and her husband is the father if he is a party to the contract. The intended parents may obtain parental rights by adoption. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(E)(3). 164 See id. § 20-158(E)(4). 165 Id. noted in depth the lack of regulation of ART. 177 What has often been referred to as the -gamete industry‖-a multi-billion dollar business in the United States-is operating under a relative dearth of regulation, which is of great concern chiefly because family law differs across states.
178
Everything from the liability of fertility clinics to the rights of donors, donor children, and hopeful couples is unregulated.
179
This causes Professor Cahn and others to exhort legal and policy-making communities to cease applying piecemeal laws. Rather, lawmakers ought to create laws that sustain the fertility industry, while at the same time protecting the interests of donors, recipients, and the children that result from successful transfers.
180
Government interference through the creation of new laws can bring new conundrums. 181 This article strongly suggests, in contrast to being forced to follow a judicial ruling or awaiting federal intervention, that the exercise of genuine personal responsibility in self-governance may lead to the right conclusion more appropriately and allow the decision-maker to own the liberty to do so. 177 Self-governance with personal and parental responsibility, as evidenced by the thoughtful and sacrificial decision-making of Sean and Carolyn Savage, provides the best outcome for marriages. It also promotes the best conclusion to avert divorce. Most importantly, it protects and provides the best outcome for the ART child. So what would be the strategy toward self-governed personally responsible decision-making in ART? The Hitchiker's Guide to an ART plan of action for any participant might look something like this:
1. When considering ART, parents view each fertilized egg that results in an embryo as a child from the point of fertilization. All embryos created are entitled to life, a discernable identity, and a future, each protected from experimentation, destruction, research, or selective pregnancy reduction. Parents understand their child's life is at stake in all their decisions.
2. Adults utilizing ART in any form view themselves as parents from the outset, particularly understanding that parental rights, obligations, and responsibilities for the best interests of the child embryo take effect upon fertilization of each embryo and continue at all times thereafter (unless consent for termination of those rights and duties is given). All fertilized eggs are afforded protection by their parents to provide for the best interests of the ART child.
3. Parents place their own personal autonomy aside to protect the ART child in every circumstance, even that of mistake, error, or wrongful pregnancy. Mothers forgo the right to abort, and fathers forgo the right to disclaim their children. Parents begin to act in the best interests of the rule the day, however, parents act selflessly, as the Savages have here, 196 providing what is best for a child regardless of the law and regardless of their own rights and privileges. Solomon's wisdom 197 is lived out in such circumstances when parents are willing to sacrifice their own interests for that of their child. 198 The use of technology in family law and family life can be an incredible and beautiful gift, as ART can be a vehicle for a life-giving blessing. Corrupted by human nature or a doctor's mistake, however, it can be the impetus to strengthen or tear apart a marriage. A divorce could be averted or could result. A child could be born or aborted. A child could be placed and raised in an intact family or fought over for custody.
ART has indeed had a tremendous impact on families 199 and family law. 200 When it is utilized in an unselfish manner through personal and parental responsibility, the honor of its potential is evident. Selfgovernment ruled the hearts and minds of Carolyn and Sean Savage, they 196 This type of -virtue jurisprudence‖ is also often associated with Aristotle and Id. Waking, the other knew the dead child was not hers. Id. The prostitutes went before the king to resolve the ensuing dispute. Id. He candidly recommended cutting the baby in half. Id. The false mother was nonplussed by this heinous suggestion, but the true mother pled desperately that her son be given over to her unscrupulous housemate, rather than be cut in two. Id. Solomon now knew the true mother from the false, and ordered her reunited with her son. Id. 198 See id. 199 See supra Parts II-IV. 200 See supra Parts V.A-V.B.
